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I. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (U.N.) was formed as World War II was ending
with the lofty goal of preventing the scourge of war from ever again
engulfing the world in global conflict. Mechanisms were devised to enable
the community of nations to work together by negotiating through their
disputes instead of resorting to war. Just as the U.N. was coming into
being, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, changing the
future nature of warfare from devastation to annihilation. The very first
General Assembly Resolution at the U.N. called for the "elimination from
national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons
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adaptable to mass destruction."' Since then, the U.N. disarmament
machinery has been running in place in pursuit of that goal.
Nuclear arsenals grew in strength and size to over 70,000 during the
height of the Cold War.2 Today, more than twenty years after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the world remains threatened by more than 20,000
nuclear weapons, still more than enough to carry out the Cold War doctrine
of Mutually Assured Destruction. The vast majority of the world has
resolved not to pursue nuclear weapons for their security, in exchange for
technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the pursuit
of nuclear disarmament.4 While some nuclear-armed states promote
modest reductions in their deployed nuclear arsenals as progress toward
nuclear disarmament, their policies and practices maintain the usefulness of
nuclear weapons far into the future. For the rest of the world, it has become
increasingly clear that there needs to be a new approach to nuclear
disarmament in order to prevent more countries from pursuing the nuclear
option.
II. NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

Nine countries are known to possess nuclear weapons: United States,
Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan,
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The first five
listed are the so-called "recognized nuclear weapons states" (NWS) of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), because each
had exploded a nuclear weapon prior to the negotiation of that Treaty.6 All
five are also state parties to the Treaty, and are thus required to fulfill all its
Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problem Raised by the Discovery of
1.
Atomic Energy, G.A. Res. l(I), U.N. GAOR, Ist Sess. (Jan. 24, 1946), http://daccess-dds(last visited on
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/032/52/IMG/NR003252.pdf9OpenElement
Mar. 2,2012).
2.
Nuclear weapons at a glance, INT'L CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
http://www.icanw.org/ataglance (last visited on Mar. 2, 2012).
3.
Id.; Shannon N. Kile, Vitaly Fedchenko, Bharath Gopalaswamy & Hans M. Kristensen,
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 2011 SIPRI YEARBOOK 7 (Stockholm
2011)
available
at
Research
Institute
International
Peace
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/201 1/files/SIPRIYBI 107-07A.pdf. (last visited May 9,2012) [hereinafter
SIPRI 2011].
4.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
5.
Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons: The Expansion of Nuclear Armaments,
UN.ORG,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/news/geneva exhibit/GenevaDisarmament_
ExhibitionPanels3.pdf (last visited on Mar. 2, 2012).
6.

Nuclear Weapons, supranote 4, art. IX (3).
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legal obligations, including the obligation in Article VI to negotiate toward
These five countries are the permanent five
nuclear disarmament.
members of the United Nations Security Council, each of whom has the
power to veto any legally binding decision made in that body.
India, Pakistan, and Israel are the only three countries in the global
community that have never signed the NPT.9 All three also have nuclear
weapons, although Israel has never publicly acknowledged its nuclear
weapon program.'o The DPRK withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and
exploded its first nuclear device in 2006."
III. UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT MACHINERY

The U.N. has an important role to play in the abolition of nuclear
weapons, as the disarmament machinery of the U.N. is uniquely
empowered to negotiate multilateral disarmament treaties. While there
have been a few successes, the world remains under the threat of over
20,000 nuclear weapons.12 More than 4800 of these nuclear weapons are
operational, and nearly 2000 of these remain on high alert, ready to be
launched within minutes of an order.13
The main disarmament machinery at the U.N. consists of the General
Assembly's First Committee, the sixty-five nation Conference on
Disarmament, and the all-inclusive Disarmament Commission. 4 Other
international conferences impact the U.N.'s nuclear disarmament activities,

7.

Id. art. VI.

8.
U.N.
Security
Counsel
Members:
Membership
http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (last visited on Mar. 2, 2012).

in

2012,

UN.ORG,

See NPT Signatories and States Parties (in alphabetical order), UN.ORG, http://unhq9.
appspub01.un.orgfUNODAffreatystatus.nsf/NPT/20(in%2oalphabetical%20order)?OpenView&Start-l &Expa
ndView (last visited on Mar. 14, 2012).
10.
Nuclear Weapons: Israel, FAS.ORG (Jan. 8, 2007), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guidel
israellnuke/ (last visited on Mar. 2, 2012).
11.
Chronology of US.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy, ARMSCONTROL.ORG,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron (last visited on Mar. 2, 2012).
12.

SIPRI 2011, supra note 3.

13.
Status of World Nuclear Forces, FAS.ORG, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/
nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html (last visited on Mar. 2, 2012).
14.
United Nations Disarmament Machinery, FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
CAN.,
available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/nuclear-nucleaire/unonu.aspx?lang=eng&view-d
(last visited on Mar. 2, 2012); Disarmament Machinery,
REACHINGCRITICALWILL.ORG, http//www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/politicalindex.html
(last
visited on Mar. 2, 2012).
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notably the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons held every five years."
The U.N.'s work toward nuclear disarmament can be described at best
as slow and, at worst, as ineffective. Thus far, the U.N. has approached
nuclear disarmament by working on several related issues, including the
management of fissile material for nuclear weapons, entry into force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, further reductions in the nuclear
forces of the United States and Russia-who together have ninety-five
percent of the world's nuclear weapons-preventing an arms race in outer
space, and legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear
weapon states (NNWS).16 Verification and compliance issues remain
obstacles that need to be overcome for all of the above.
The U.N.'s incremental approach to nuclear disarmament has been
stalled for at least the past fifteen years, prompting calls from the nonnuclear armed states that make up the vast majority of the world for a
legally binding nuclear weapon convention and the time-bound,
internationally verifiable total elimination of nuclear weapons.17 In 2008,
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon proposed a five-point plan for nuclear
disarmament echoing this call, which included working for nuclear
disarmament either through a "framework of separate, mutually reinforcing
instruments or through the negotiation of a nuclear weapon convention,
such as the one already submitted in draft form to the U.N. by Costa Rica
and Malaysia."' 8
IV. TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The NPT is considered the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation regime. Treaty negotiations began within the U.N. system
in 1965, after the Conference on Disarmament (CD) voted to honor the
request of the then eighteen-nation Disarmament Committee to consider a

15.

Nuclear Weapons, supra note 4, art. VIII (3).

16.
The Core Issues, REACHINGCRITICALWILL.ORG, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/
political/cd/basicinfo/Coreissuesindex.htm (last visited on Mar. 2,2012).
17. Review Conf. to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, N.Y., May 325, 2010, 2010 Review Conference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons: Final
Document, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF. 2010/50 (Vol. 1), pt. 1 (May 25, 2010) [hereinafter NPT Review
Conference Final Document].
18.
Ban Ki-Moon, Sec'y Gen., Address to the East-West Institute, "Nations and security in a
nuclear-weapon-free world" UN.ORG, (Oct. 24, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/
infocus/sgspeeches/searchfull.asp?statlD=351 (last visited on Mar. 2, 2012).
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treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.19 China had just
become the fifth country to explode a nuclear weapon, and with nuclear
technology spreading unregulated around the world, it was clear that
without some kind of multilateral treaty, nuclear weapons would spread to
more states.2 0
The NPT is a three part bargain: NWS agree not to transfer nuclear
weapons to any NNWS, and NNWS parties agree not to acquire nuclear
weapons; NWS agree to negotiate a treaty on nuclear disarmament; and
NNWS have the inalienable right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes.
The NPT's segregation of states into nuclear weapon "haves" and
"have-nots" was meant to be only temporary, as Article VI obligates the
negotiation "in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." 21 However,
while the NPT obligates NNWS to conclude safeguard agreements with the
International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure compliance with the nonproliferation aspect of the Treaty's bargain, no comparable mechanism was
put into the Treaty to enforce the obligation of NWS to negotiate toward
nuclear disarmament.2 2 This lacuna arguably figures as the key defect of the
NPT. Moreover, while the five year NPT Review Conferences were meant
to measure progress on all parts of the bargain, when the Treaty was
indefinitely extended in 1995, even this modest monitoring mechanism of
the nuclear disarmament obligation was eliminated.23
V. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT STALLED AT THE U.N.

A. The Security Council
The most basic reason the U.N. system has failed to achieve nuclear
disarmament is that the five veto-holding permanent members of the
Security Council are also the five recognized NWS parties to the NPT.
Despite annual General Assembly Resolutions calling for greater progress

19.
See generally B. Goldschmidt, The Negotiation of the Non-Prolhferation Treaty, 22 IAEA
73,
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bul1223_4/223
BULL
403587380.pdf (last visited on Mar. 2, 2012).
20.
Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Assoc., Chronology of Key Events in the Effort to End
Nuclear Testing: 1945-1999, REACHINGCRITIALWILL.ORG, http://www.reachingeriticalwill.org/legal/
ctbt/ctbtchrono.html (last visited on Mar. 2, 2012).
21.

Nuclear Weapons, supra note 4, art. VI.

22.

Nuclear Weapons, supra note 4, art. III.

23.

Nuclear Weapons, supra note 4, art. X, VI.
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toward achieving nuclear disarmament,24 the Security Council will not
exercise its power to write a legally binding Resolution mandating nuclear
disarmament. There have been calls to reform the Security Council by
expanding its permanent membership, 25 but without a change to the veto
policy-which is not under consideration-the Security Council will not
act to force greater progress toward achieving nuclear disarmament.
B. The Rule of Consensus in the Conference on Disarmament

The CD is the U.N.'s sole multilateral negotiating forum. It meets
three times each year in Geneva and has four core issues its members feel
are ripe for negotiation: the prevention of an arms race in outer space,
nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), and negative
security assurances. 27 Votes are taken on the basis of consensus, meaning
that each state holds a veto power over the group's decision-making
capability.28 Since the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was negotiated in
1996, the CD has made no progress on negotiating treaties on any of its
four core issues. 29 The CD has been in a stalemate for so long, that its first
session in 2009 was considered a success merely because the parties
adopted a programme of work.o Sadly, the programme was not
implemented before the end of the year, bringing the negotiating back to
square one in 2011.31 No agreement was reached in 2011, and the CD

24. See generally U.N.
General Assembly:
Regular
http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm (last visited on Mar. 14, 2012).
25.

Sessions,

UN.ORG,

U.N. GAOR, 45th & 46th Sess., 64th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/10887 (Nov. 13, 2009).

26.
The United Nations Office at Geneva: Disarmament, An Introduction to the Conference,
UNOG.CH, http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943//28httpPages%29/BFl8ABFEFE5D344DC1256
F3100311 CE9?OpenDocument (last visited on Mar. 2, 2012).
27.
See
Disarmament,
An
Introduction
to
the
Conference,
UNOG.CH,
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943//28httpPages%29/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F310031 IC
E9?OpenDocument (last visited on Mar. 2, 2012).
28.
Basic
information
about
the
CD,
REACHINGCRITIALWILL.ORG,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/basicinfoindex.html (last visited on Mar. 2. 2012).
29.

Id.

30. Ray Acheson, The Conference on Disarmament in 2009:
Could Do Better,
DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (U.K.), available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd91/91cd.htm (last
visited on Mar. 2, 2012); CD adopts a programme of work!, REACHINGCRITICALWILL.ORG (May 29,
2009), http://reachingcriticalwill.blogspot.com/2009/05/cd-adopts-programme-of-work.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2012).
31.
Guide to the Conference on Disarmament, REACHINGCRITICALWILL.ORG (2011),
http://www.reachingriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdbook201 1.pdf (last visited on Mar. 3, 2012).
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again closed its final session without agreeing on what to work on, let alone
beginning that important work.32
The consensus rule has prevented negotiations from starting in the CD
on a FMCT. 3 Ending the production and managing stocks of fissile
material is an important part of any nuclear disarmament regime, because
fissile material makes up the nuclear explosive core of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan has stalled negotiation of an FMCT in the CD over concern that
such a treaty would not cover existing stocks of fissile material and would,
therefore, freeze Pakistan in what it perceives to be a disadvantage vis-i-vis
India, which has a larger stockpile of fissile material and would, therefore,
be able to make more nuclear weapons under a production-only ban.34
Some states continue to suggest that an FMCT be negotiated outside of
the CD to overcome this blockage caused by the consensus rule.3 ' There is
precedent for moving negotiations outside the CD-both the Land Mines
and Cluster Munitions Conventions were negotiated this way, but both lack
the support of certain key countries that continue to use these terrible
weapons.3 6 The nuclear powers have made it clear that they will not
support discussions on key nuclear disarmament issues outside the CD, and
therefore, progress remains blocked.
C. The First Committee and Special Session on DisarmamentIV

The General Assembly's First Committee meets in October at U.N.
headquarters in New York to discuss matters of nuclear and conventional
disarmament. In 2011, many states renewed their expressions of concern
about what they see as a lack of progress toward achieving nuclear
Irsten, CD closes another failed session,
Film & Gabriella
Beatrice
32.
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/
15,
2011),
(Sept.
REACHINGCRrnICALWILL.ORG
political/cd/201 1/reports.html#septl5 (last visited on Mar. 3,2012).
33.
Gary Quinlan, Ambassador & Permanent Rep. of Austl. to the U.N., Statement on behalf
of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (July 27, 2011), available at
(last
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/201 1/statements/plenary/27071 lAustralia.pdf
visited on Mar. 3, 2012).
to
the
FMCT,
Background
Cut-off
Treaty:
Materials
34.
Fissile
REACHINGCRITICALWILL.ORG, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/fmct.html (last visited on Mar.
3, 2012).
35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.
Tom Z. Collina, PS Struggles to Unblock FMCT Talks, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N (Oct.
2011), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_10/PSStruggles-toUnblockFMCT Talks (last visited
on Mar. 3, 2012).
38.

See About the

General Assembly, GEN. ASSEMBLY

http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/index.shtml (last visited on Mar. 3, 2012).

OF THE UNITED

NATIONS,
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disarmament. 9 While numbers of deployed American and Russian nuclear
weapons slowly come down, nuclear weapons and their delivery systems
continue to be modernized, and security policies project nuclear weapons
far into the future.40 Since 1995, the General Assembly has called for the
convening of a fourth Special Session on Disarmament to break the
stalemated nuclear disarmament work within the entire U.N. system. 4 1
Despite creating open-ended working groups in 2003 and 2007, there has
been no progress on establishing the objectives and agenda for the fourth
Special Session on Disarmament, and no meetings have taken place.42
One subject that was raised by many states in the 2011 First
Committee was the forward-looking action plan for nuclear disarmament
contained in the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference in 2010.43
The Final Document must be adopted by consensus, and therefore, all five
NWS have obligated themselves to fulfill the action plan's commitments,
including to "pursue policies that are fully compatible with the treaty and
the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons," and to "apply
the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to
the implementation of their treaty obligations."" The action plan covers
deployed as well as non-deployed nuclear weapons and calls on all states to
ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which is awaiting
ratification by eight countries mentioned in its Annex II, before it can enter
into force. 45 The 2010 Review Conference Final Document's action plan
was hailed as a great success, but the next Review Conference in 2015 will
ultimately reveal whether these commitments were successfully carried out
or if, as happened after 1995 and 2000, these commitments will remain
unfulfilled.
Disarmament Machinery,
39.
Ray Acheson, First Committee Monitor 2011:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM ll/final.html
REACHINGCRITICALWILL.ORG,
(last visited on Mar. 14, 2012).
40. Candice DeNardi, START/Russian Nuclear Policy, NUCLEAR FILES (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://nuclearfiles.org/menulkey-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/russian-nuclearpolicy/PDFs/denarditreaty overview.pdf (last visited on Mar. 3, 2012); Hans M. Kristensen, A New
Defense Strategy: A New Nuclear Strategy?, FAS STRATEGIC SEC. BLOG (Jan. 5, 2012),
http://www.fas.orgfblog/ssp/2012/01/a-new-defense-strategy.php (last visited on Mar. 3, 2012); Hans M.
Kristensen, Nuclear Plan Conflicts with New Budget Realities, FAS STRATEGIC SEV. BLOG (Sept. 12,
2012), http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/09/stockpileplan2011.php (last visited on Mar. 3, 2012).
41.
Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, UN.ORG,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/SSOD/index.shtml (last visited on Mar. 3, 2012).
42.

Id.

43.

See NPT Review Conference Final Document, supranote 17.

44.

Id. at 20.

45.

Id. at 22.
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The progress that has been made toward nuclear disarmament has
come from outside the U.N. system and the obligations of the NPT, through
bilateral arms control treaties between the United States and the former
Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation. Agreements such as the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty reduced the number of deployed nuclear warheads and delivery
systems, but deep, irreversible cuts in nuclear arsenals under international
verification remain elusive."
VI. CURRENT NUCLEAR DOCTRINES AND FORCE LEVELS OF NUCLEAR
ARMED STATES

A. United States ofAmerica
The Obama administration initially brought hope that the United States
would actively pursue nuclear disarmament and not only non-proliferation.
In April 2009, President Obama gave a speech in Prague, pledging that the
United States would seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear
weapons.4 7 In the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released just before the
2010 NPT Review Conference, the United States made some changes to its
nuclear policy, while ultimately falling short of abandoning its Cold War
mentality and achieving more far reaching change.4 8
One welcome change in the NPR is that the prevention of nuclear
proliferation and nuclear terrorism has been elevated to the United State's
top priority.49 Previously the top U.S. nuclear policy priority was to
maintain a strategic balance with Russia in order to protect the United
States against a disarming first strike,o evolving in 2002 to a more

Anatoli Diakov & Frank von Hippel, Challenges and Opportunities for Russia-US.
46.
5-13
(2009),
available at
Control,
CENTURY
FOUND.,
at
Nuclear
Arms
http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/Diakov-Hippel-Challenges.pdf (last visited on Mar. 4, 2012).
47.
Barack Obama, President, United States of America, Remarks by President Barack
Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_pressoffice/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-AsDelivered/ (last visited on Mar. 4, 2012).
48.
See generally DEP'T OF DEF., NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT (2010), available at
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear/*20posture%20review/2Oreport.pdf (last visited on
Mar. 4, 2012) [hereinafter NPR 2010].
49.

Id. at v.

See Alexei Fenenko, Between MAD and Flexible Response: Russian and U.S. Nuclear
50.
(June 22, 2011), available at
Policies after the Cold War, GLOBALAFFAIRS.RU
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/print/number/Between-MAD-and-Flexible-Response-15242 (last visited on
Mar. 4, 2012).
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offensive approach toward an even broader set of potential adversaries.'
Another change came in U.S. declaratory policy, which had been one of
"calculated ambiguity," in that the United States would not say under what
52
circumstances it would consider the use of nuclear weapons. In the new
NPR, the United States clarifies its policy in this regard for the first time:
"The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as
long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United
States, our allies, and partners., 53 This is an important change from
previous NPRs that endorsed nuclear responses not only to nuclear, but also
chemical, biological, or even conventional attack on the United States or its
allies. 54 However, this new policy does not state that the sole purpose of
the U.S. nuclear arsenal is for nuclear deterrence, and in that sense, the
NPR leaves open the possibility of offensive use.
The NPR did little else to change U.S. nuclear policy. The United
States did not issue an unqualified "no-first use" policy or change the alert
status for nuclear weapons, leaving hundreds of nuclear-armed ballistic
missiles ready to launch within fifteen minutes of an order to do so. The
NPR also called for continuing to modernize the nuclear weapons complex
and nuclear warheads and their delivery systems, and it reaffirmed the
importance of the nuclear triad-delivery systems for nuclear weapons by
air, land-based missiles, and sea-based missiles." It remains to be seen if
or how this new nuclear posture will change actual targeting. Overall, U.S.
nuclear policy remains focused on Cold War thinking and maintaining a
large nuclear arsenal into the indefinite future.
B. Russian Federation

Russia also announced a new military policy in 2010, which seemed to
add some constraint in considering the use of nuclear weapons-from the
previous "in situations critical to national security" to the new, "when the

51.

U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT To THE PRESIDENT & THE CONGRESS chapters. 1, 7

(2002), available at http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr20O2/html-files/chap7.htm (last visited on Mar. 4,
2012).
Chair William J. Perry, Chair Brent Scowcroft & Project Dir. Charles D. Ferguson,
52.
Council on Foreign Relations: Independent Task Force Report No. 62, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,
at 16-17 (2009).
53.

NPR 2010, supranote 48, at vii.

Philipp C. Bleek, Nuclear Posture Review Leaks: Outlines Targets, Contingencies,
54.
http://www.armscontrol.orglact/201 1_10/P5_Strugglesto
2002),
(Apr.
ARMSCONTROL.ORG
UnblockFMCTTalks (last visited on Mar. 4,2012).
55.

See NPR 2010, supra note 48, at 20.
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very existence of the state is threatened."56 In either case, however, nuclear
weapons are threatened in retaliation, not only for nuclear attack, but also
for chemical, biological, and conventional attack."
While the United States and Russia have agreed under the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to modest reductions of deployed nuclear
warheads and their delivery systems, Russia-like the United Statescontinues to modernize its nuclear arsenal.58 Worried about the capabilities
of future U.S. missile defense systems, Russia's newest nuclear policy
seeks to ensure that nation's deterrent and second-strike capability. To that
end, Russia continues to prioritize the deployment of road-mobile
intercontinental ballistic missiles and a new type of submarine-launched
ballistic missile. 59
C. United Kingdom of Great Britainand Northern Ireland

Unlike the United States and Russia who have land, sea, and airlaunching capability for their nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom has
only a sea-based nuclear deterrent, comprised of four Vanguard Class
Trident Submarines with approximately 160 operational warheads.60 Each
sub has sixteen Trident II D5 missiles that can carry up to forty-eight
warheads, and one sub is at sea at all times. 6 ' Since the end of the Cold
War, the nuclear-capable submarine on patrol has been kept at a level of
reduced readiness, with its missiles de-targeted and a "notice to fire"
measured in days, not minutes or hours.62
The U.K.'s submarines are aging, and will begin to be retired in
2024.3 A debate has been underway for over seven years in the United
Nikolai Sokov, The New, 2010 Russian MilitaryDoctrine: The Nuclear Angle, CTR. FOR
56.
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/I00205_russian
5, 2010),
STUDIES
(Feb.
NONPROLIFERATION
nucleardoctrine.htm (last visited on Mar. 4, 2012).
57.

Id.

58.
Pavel Podvig, Russia's Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmamentand Modernization, IFRI
SEC. STUDIES CTR., at 9 (2011), available at www.ifri.org/downloads/pp37podvig.pdf (last visited on
Mar. 14, 2012).
59.
Hans Kristensen, Russian Nuclear Forces 2010, FAS STRATEGIC SEC. BLOG (Jan. 12,
2011), http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/01/russia2010.php (last visited on Mar. 4, 2012).
60.
Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, British nuclear forces, 2011, 5 BULL. OF THE
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Kingdom about whether or how to fund the future of this program.64 The
latest Security Review of October 2010 stated that the United Kingdom is
planning to replace their submarines with a new class of nuclear-capable
subs equipped with a modified Trident missile supplied by the United
States.
Only eight launch tubes will be operational in normal
circumstances, and the maximum number of nuclear warheads carried on
each submarine will decrease from forty-eight to forty. 6 Exact warhead
and sub designs will likely be delayed until after the next general election in
2016, meaning the service lives of the current fleet will have to be
extended.
D. France

France's nuclear forces consist of aircraft and nuclear-capable
submarines that carry about 300 warheads.6 8 Nuclear policy was defined in
a 2008 white paper that stated that France will continue relying on the
"principle of strict sufficiency" or minimum deterrence to guarantee its
security, provided by a permanent submarine patrol and airborne
capability.69
France has a new nuclear-capable submarine and both sea and landbased nuclear capable aircraft.o France also remains committed to
sustaining its nuclear weapon complex, including research and development
capabilities. France signed a technical nuclear cooperation agreement with
the United Kingdom in 2010 to exchange information on nuclear weapon
safety and security and stockpile certification.n
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E. People's Republic of China
Concern has been expressed by some nuclear-armed states about the
buildup of Chinese nuclear forces and the potential challenge they may
present to the current international order. However, China's nuclear arsenal
remains relatively small, at approximately 200 nuclear weapons, and its
build-up is mostly in land-based delivery systems.72 China's nuclear
weapons are also deliverable by air.
As a way to make their nuclear forces more survivable, China has been
increasing the number of its medium and long-range missile delivery
systems. 74 Development of a sea-based deterrent has been ongoing, but has
yet to become fully operational.75 As of 2010, China has three submarines
71
either in service or in various stages of construction and outfitting.
China's latest nuclear policy was released in March 2011 in a white
paper, which reiterated China's commitment to its "no first use" policy and
to retaining its nuclear capabilities at the minimum required for national
security. 77
F. India, Pakistan,and Israel
Three states have never signed the NPT, and all three have nuclear
weapons: India, Pakistan, and Israel. The nuclear arsenals of these three
states are relatively small compared with those of the five NPT recognized
nuclear powers, but contribute greatly to instability in their respective
regions. As previously mentioned, the main issue between India and
Pakistan relates to fissile material, as Pakistan is determined to maintain
parity with India in the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons in the
future. Israel's lack of transparency regarding its nuclear weapon program
prevents in-depth analysis of their nuclear policy.
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G. DemocraticPeople'sRepublic ofKorea
The DPRK is the only nation to have withdrawn from the NPT. 8 The
first DPRK nuclear explosion took place underground in October 2006, and
its second nuclear test was in May 2009.
The DPRK is believed to have separated between twenty-four-fortytwo kilograms of plutonium, which would enable the construction of up to
eight nuclear weapons. 7 9 The plutonium in the DPRK comes from their
nuclear energy program, which was at least partly made possible through
the technical cooperation received while a party to the NPT. Plutonium is a
byproduct of the nuclear reaction in nuclear power reactors and can be
separated out by a chemical process and used to create nuclear weapons.
Six-party talks between DPRK, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the
United States resumed in 2003 in an attempt to achieve the denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula, but have been stalled since 2009.80 It is unclear if
the DPRK is pursuing a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons
as well at the Yongbyon nuclear site.8 ' The DPRK has made vague nuclear
threats,82 but without a credible means of delivery, the threat of nuclear
attack by the DPRK is minimal.
VII. CONCLUSION
The policies of nuclear-armed states continue to rely on nuclear
weapons into the foreseeable future. The U.N.'s incremental approach
toward achieving nuclear disarmament has come to a standstill, leaving the
world threatened by more than 20,000 nuclear weapons and enabling
billions of dollars to continue to be invested in the modernization of nuclear
warheads, delivery systems, and infrastructure. The five NPT nuclear
weapon states, however, obligated themselves in that Treaty and in
subsequent Review Conferences to pursue nuclear disarmament, and it is
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clear that the rest of the world is not willing to wait indefinitely for that
obligation to be fulfilled.
If the NPT regime fails and its bargain falls apart, it is likely that
several new states would acquire nuclear weapons for their own power and
prestige, increasing the already dangerous possibility of accidental or
intentional use, or even sale or theft of nuclear weapons or materials. This
future is in no state's interest, which brings some hope that nuclear-armed
states will eventually work with the rest of the world on an alternative
approach to nuclear disarmament.
Nuclear weapons are not necessary for today's security threats, and the
expense of maintaining them not only takes away from other legitimate
military needs, but also cannot be defended in this financial climate. More
NWS makes for an even more dangerous world, and while this is well
known by all states at the U.N., it has not translated into concrete action.
At present, the U.N. disarmament machinery remains paralyzed, but the
2010 NPT Review Conference's action plan may finally prompt NWS to
make some progress toward nuclear disarmament before the next Review
Conference in 2015. Before that benchmark is reached, civil society should
continue to work with non-nuclear armed states to push for the negotiation
of a nuclear weapon convention that provides a time-bound, irreversible,
and verifiable framework for the total elimination of nuclear weapons,
whether within the U.N. system or, if necessary, in some other forum.

